Meiotin‐1 is a protein found in developing microsporocytes of Lilium longiflorum, and immunological assays indicate that cognates exist in both mono‐ and dicotyledonous plants. Its temporal and spatial expression pattern, coupled with its unusual distribution in chromatin and the properties it shares with histone H1, encourages speculation that it is involved in regulating meiotic chromatin structure. Molecular analyses provide support for the hypothesis that meiotin‐1 arose from histone H1 by an exon shuffling mechanism, as meiotin‐1 is an H1‐like protein that (...) lacks the amino‐terminal domain shared by H1 molecules. We have proposed that meiotin‐1 serves to limit chromatin condensation in order to foster the unique cytological and molecular events which occur during meiotic prophase. As such, meiotin‐1 fits the role of a ‘meiosis readiness factor’, and its accumulation to a threshold level may commit mitotically dividing progenitor cells to differentiate into meiocytes. (shrink)

Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have found little evidence of moral integrity. We (...) have found considerable evidence of a different form of moral motivation, moral hypocrisy. The goal of moral hypocrisy is to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral. To fully reach the goal of moral hypocrisy requires self-deception, and we have found evidence of that as well. Strengthening moral integrity is difficult. Even effects of moral perspective taking – imagining yourself in the place of the other (as recommended by the Golden Rule) – appear limited, further contributing to the moral masquerade. (shrink)

Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very (...) little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards. (shrink)

This book traces the scientific search for altruism through numerous studies and attempts to examine various motivational suspects, reaching the improbable conclusion that empathy-induced altruism is indeed part of our nature. The book then considers the implications of this conclusion both for our understanding of who we are as humans and for how we might create a more humane society.

Moral hypocrisy is motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral. In business, moral hypocrisy allows one to engender trust, solve the commitment problem, and still relentlessly pursue personal gain. Indicating the power of this motive, research has provided clear and consistent evidence that, given the opportunity, many people act to appear fair (e.g., they flip a coin to distribute resources between themselves and another person) without actually being fair (they accept the flip only (...) if it favors themselves). New evidence also indicates the power of moral hypocrisy in a situation more obviously relevant to business, resource allocation when one party has information about relative resource value that the other does not. Characteristics of modern business situations likely to encourage moral hypocrisy are outlined. We conclude that moral hypocrisy is not only a pragmatic virtue in modern business but is also fast becoming a prescriptive one. (shrink)

Aristotle is essentially human; that is, for all possible worlds metaphysically consistent with our own, if Aristotle exists, then he is human. This is a claim about the essential property of an object. The claim that objects have essential properties has been hotly disputed, but for present purposes, we can bracket that issue. In this essay, we are interested, rather, in the question of whether properties themselves have essential properties (or features) for their existence. We call those who suppose they (...) do “property essentialists”; those who do not, “property anti-essentialists,” or “quidditists.” We offer two complementary arguments. Our total argument is under-girded by two assumptions: transworld identity theory and “received view” counterfactual semantics, a la David Lewis. We then argue that, if one presumes that these are true, then one risks running headlong into paradox if one also accepts property anti-essentialism. That's the first argument. By contrast, if one accepts these same assumptions in conjunction with property essentialism, then the paradox is avoided. This is the second argument. We take it that our arguments work to show that, between property essentialism and quidditism, the property essentialist is on better footing. Plausibly, properties themselves do have essential properties for their existence. (shrink)

Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient (...) problems of moral and political freedom. Like the planet's atmosphere on which life depends, the conditions on which our freedom depends had to evolve, and like the atmosphere, they continue to evolve-and could be extinguished. According to Dennett, biology provides the perspective from which we can distinguish the varieties of freedom that matter. Throughout the history of life on this planet, an interacting web and internal and external conditions have provided the frameworks for the design of agents that are more free than their parts-from the unwitting gropings of the simplest life forms to the more informed activities of animals to the moral dilemmas that confront human beings living in societies. As in his previous books, Dennett weaves a richly detailed narrative enlivened by analogies as entertaining as they are challenging. Here is the story of how we came to be different from all other creatures, how our early ancestors mindlessly created human culture, and then, how culture gave us our minds, our visions, our moral problems-in a nutshell, our freedom. (shrink)

For more than two decades, international debate over a New World Communication and Information Order has called attention to the question of whether or not newspapers around the world are limited by the alleged dominance of the international news flow by the Western media. Looking at how six newspapers from around the world covered the 1983 downing of KAL Flight 007 by the Soviet Union, we find that papers are in fact able to shape their coverage of major international events (...) through their choice of providers, their selection and interpretation of subjects and facts, and their use of headlines to emphasize and frame information. Thus, newspapers can delimit choice to suit their own needs and goals. (shrink)

This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.

Jaakko Hintikka (1998) has argued that clarifying the notion of abduction is the fundamental problem of contemporary epistemology. One traditional interpretation of Peirce on abduction sees it as a recipe for generating new theoretical discoveries . A second standard view sees abduction as a mode of reasoning that justifies beliefs about the probable truth of theories. While each reading has some grounding in Peirce's writings, each leaves out features that are crucial to Peirce's distinctive understanding of abduction. I develop and (...) defend a third interpretation, according to which Peirce takes abductive reasoning to lead to judgments about the relative pursuitworthiness of theories; conclusions that can be thoroughly disconnected from assessments of truth-value. Even if Peirce's use of "abduction" slides around among each of these three importantly different though potentially compatible senses, this neglected third understanding makes sense of a large number of Peirce's remarks and directs our attention to the cognitive structure of judgments that scientists face after the initial proposal of explanatory hypotheses but prior to their experimental testing; a topic which should be of interest to contemporary philosophers of science. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

This treatise was written c. 1200, and is the earliest known philosophical work by an Oxford master. Its great interest is that it demonstrates the way in which the first generation of scholars used the translations of Greek and Arabic philosophical scientific texts which had just become available in Western Europe.

in Evolution and Culture eds.Stephen C. Levinson and Pierre Jaisson, published by The MIT Press, 2006.

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, very roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes papers on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The articles in OSEMP will be of importance to (...) specialists within the discipline, but the editors also intend that they should appeal to a larger audience of philosophers, intellectual historians, and others who are interested in the development of modern thought. (shrink)

A number of theories of dispositions to date have presupposed that dispositions are all causal: when X is disposed to PHI in circumstances C, it is because of a potential causal connection between C and X’s PHIing. Other intimate connections between dispositions and causation have been argued for: that the relation between dispositions and their categorical bases is to be understood in causal terms, for example, or even that we can explain causation in dispositional terms. These theories of dispositions are (...) all threatened by previously underappreciated cases of noncausal dispositions: cases where an X is disposed to PHI in C, but not because of potential causal connections between the manifestation conditions of dispositions and the manifestations themselves. This paper argues that there are noncausal dispositions of a number of different varieties, explains what trouble this causes many standard theories of dispositions, and discusses what lessons can be learned from these cases for the nature of dispositions. Some of the cases discussed will also cast doubt on the idea that all dispositions ground truths about potentiality or possibility. (shrink)

Eduquer, c'est stimuler les jeunes au dépassement de soi et à l'exploitation de leurs compétences sur les plans intellectuel, social et de la communication. La Philosophie pour enfants - et son adaptation à l'apprentissage des mathématiques - est une approche pertinente et significative pour stimuler chez les élèves des compétences transversales reliées à la pensée critique, à la coopération avec autrui et à la communication. Cet ouvrage étudie, pas à pas, à l'aide de nombreux exemples tirés des discussions entre élèves (...) de 10-11 ans, un processus d'apprentissage de la pensée critique. Ce faisant, il met en lumière un processus d'enseignement socio-constructiviste. Il présente à l'enseignante et à l'enseignant une banque de questions pour que les échanges entre les élèves dépassent l'anecdote et deviennent dialogue ; il explique la transformation d'une classe en " communauté de recherche ", base essentielle au développement d'une pensée critique ; finalement, il propose une grille pour évaluer ce processus d'apprentissage chez les élèves. (shrink)

This work presents results of improvement in the productivity of Arthrospira platensis in a company dedicated to its production. The six sigma methodology was applied in production processes that require the use of bioreactors. Starting from the analysis of the current state, aspects, physical and chemical variables that directly influence the productivity achieved were identified. Various culture media were tested and subsequently scaled for industrial production. In addition, the incorporation of carbon into the culture medium was controlled, optimizing the range (...) of potential hydrogen pH. The identified parameters were measured and six sigma methodology strategies were assigned. An improvement in productivity corresponding to 66% was verified with the same quality of final product. Keywords: Six sigma, Bioreactors, Productivity, Arthrospira platensis. References [1]E. Ariawan and A. Makalew, “Smart Micro Farm: Sustainable Algae Spirulina Growth Monitoring System” in 10th International Conference on Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, Bali, 2018, pp.1-4. [2]L. Socconini and C. Reato, Lean six sigma: sistema de gestión para liderar empresas. Primera edición. Barcelona: Marge Books, 2019. [3]H. Gutiérrez, Calidad and productividad. Cuarta edición. México D.F.: McGraw-Hill Interamericana, 2014. [4]G. Usharani, P. Saranraj and D. Kanchana, “Spirulina Cultivation: A Review” in International Journal of Pharmaceutical & Biological Archives, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 1327-1336, December 2012. [5]J. Udin, O. Gani, A. Mahato, I. Sakib and M. Rakiuzzaman, SPIRULINA PRODUCTION IN DIFFERENT PHOTOBIOREACTORS ON ROOFTOP, International Journal of Business, Social and Scientific Research, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 15-19, January 2020. [6]M. Arredondo, Contabilidad y análisis de costos. Primera edición. México D.F.: Grupo Editorial Patria, 2015. [7]J. García, Contabilidad de costos. Cuarta edición. México D.F.: McGraw-Hill Interamericana, 2014. [8]L. Socconini, Certificación Lean Six Sigma Green Belt para la excelencia en los negocios. Primera edición. Barcelona: Marge Books, 2015. [9]A. Vian, Introducción a la Química Industrial. Segunda edición. Buenos Aires: Reverté, 2012. [10]S. Milton, Estadística para Biología y Ciencias de la Salud. Tercera edición. Madrid: McGraw-Hill Interamericana, 2014. (shrink)

L'intitulé du présent ouvrage a été choisi pour faire écho à la critique formulée naguère par Jean-François Lyotard à l'encontre d'Adorno : Lyotard réclamait, pour aborder les musiques qu'il estimait susceptibles de participer authentiquement à la " réécriture de la modernité ", que l'on abandonnât l'" alternative " définie par cet auteur ; n'étant " ni apparence, musica ficta, ni connaissance laborieuse, musica fingens ", l'œuvre (ou la non-œuvre) " littérale ", povera, serait " jeu métamorphique d'intensités sonores, travail parodique (...) de rien, musica figura ". On s'est donc efforcé, d'enquêter sur l'élaboration de la " catégorie postmodernité " prise in statu nascendi, c'est-à-dire à sa source musicale. Cela permettait de faire droit à la relative complexité sémantique du mot fiction. Celui-ci n'est pas seulement synonyme de " fabrication ", car au latin fabricare, le fingere ajoute la nuance d'une " feinte ". Et " feinte " nous expédie vers l'eirôneia des Grecs " ironie " et postmodernité ne peuvent que s'entendre. Mais le premier des ironistes postmodernes n'est autre que le premier musicien vraiment répétitif : Nietzsche. Son Fragment an sich, un morceau de piano de 22 mesures daté de 1871, comporte en effet un Da Capo non chiffré : illimité! La fiction musicale de la postmodernité, ne serait-ce pas dès lors la ritournelle, figure (figura) de l'éternel retour? (shrink)

Bennett and Hacker’s _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), a collaboration between a philosopher (Hacker) and a neuroscientist (Bennett), is an ambitious attempt to reformulate the research agenda of cognitive neuroscience by demonstrating that cognitive scientists and other theorists, myself among them, have been bewitching each other by misusing language in a systematically “incoherent” and conceptually “confused” way. In both style and substance, the book harks back to Oxford in the early 1960's, when Ordinary Language Philosophy ruled, and Ryle and (...) Wittgenstein were the authorities on the meanings of our everyday mentalistic or psychological terms. I myself am a product of that time and place (as is Searle, for that matter), and I find much to agree with in their goals and presuppositions, and before turning to my criticisms, which will be severe, I want to highlight what I think is exactly right in their approach–the oft-forgotten lessons of Ordinary Language Philosophy. (shrink)

Are there dispositions which not only do not manifest, but which could not manifest? We argue that there are dispositions to Ф in circumstances C where C is impossible, and some where Ф is impossible. Furthermore, postulating these dispositions does useful theoretical work. This paper describes a number of cases of dispositions had by objects even though those dispositions are not possibly manifest, and argues for the importance of these dispositions.

Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.

We are highly tuned to each other's visual attention. Perceiving the eye or hand movements of another person can influence the timing of a saccade or the reach of our own. However, the explanation for such spatial orienting in interpersonal contexts remains disputed. Is it due to the social appearance of the cue—a hand or an eye—or due to its social relevance—a cue that is connected to another person with attentional and intentional states? We developed an interpersonal version of the (...) Posner spatial cueing paradigm. Participants saw a cue and detected a target at the same or a different location, while interacting with an unseen partner. Participants were led to believe that the cue was either connected to the gaze location of their partner or was generated randomly by a computer (Experiment 1), and that their partner had higher or lower social rank while engaged in the same or a different task (Experiment 2). We found that spatial cue‐target compatibility effects were greater when the cue related to a partner's gaze. This effect was amplified by the partner's social rank, but only when participants believed their partner was engaged in the same task. Taken together, this is strong evidence in support of the idea that spatial orienting is interpersonally attuned to the social relevance of the cue—whether the cue is connected to another person, who this person is, and what this person is doing—and does not exclusively rely on the social appearance of the cue. Visual attention is not only guided by the physical salience of one's environment but also by the mental representation of its social relevance. (shrink)

This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.

This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or "phronesis"--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which ...

Damasio remarks, it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly." Indeed, serial information processing models generally run this risk (Kinsbourne, 1985). The commentaries provide a wealth of confirming instances of the seductive power of this idea. Our sternest critics Block, Farah, Libet, and Treisman) adopt fairly standard Cartesian positions; more interesting are those commentators who take themselves to be mainly in agreement with us, but who express reservations or offer support with arguments that betray a continuing (...) allegiance to one or another tenet of the view we sought to discredit. (shrink)

The argument of this paper is threefold: (a) Charles Bonnet’s naturalization of the principle of perfectibility (in the wake of Rousseau) is one example of a more general philosophical operation to be found in his writings: to naturalize the metaphysical while insisting upon its minimal difference from the material and so to generate an immaterialism that looks like a materialism; (b) this operation structures Bonnet’s entire palingenetic project which can be defined as an ‘anomalous naturalism’; (c) variants of this anomalous (...) naturalism were available to German philosophers during the last decades of the eighteenth century – philosophers such as G. E. Lessing, F. H. Jacobi and J. G. Herder – and, to this extent, their writings also display traits of this ‘anomalous naturalism’. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone establecer un nuevo paradigma común entre la filosofía neoplatónica de época imperial y la filosofía vedántica a partir de los conceptos de theios aner y jivanmukta. Partiendo de un breve recorrido por algunas de las manifestaciones de la doctrina brahmánica en la Roma de los siglos II y III d. C., canalizadas por un sincretismo teocéntrico, el análisis se dividirá en dos grandes bloques: (1) La descripción del sustrato metafísico común a ambos términos, basado en la (...) idea de la unión (hénosis) y la reconciliación intuitiva del alma y el absoluto a partir del autoconocimiento y (2) La descripción del sustrato moral, basado en el ejercicio de una catártica contemplativa. Así mismo, se plantean algunas dificultades relativas al papel soteriológico del sabio liberado y su relación con las dos grandes corrientes del neoplatonismo imperial. (shrink)

Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...) representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness. (shrink)